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Abstract:
This paper presents a small theoretical model to compare school systems that segregate students by ability
(“tracking”) with comprehensive ones, which allow for mixing of differently skilled students into same classes.
The outcomes of interest are the achievement levels of weaker and better students, and the average achieve-
ment of all students. In the model, the instructional pace is tailored to the skill distribution of a class, and
higher-achieving peers are an additional source of learning. The results show that differences in both the share
of high-achievers and degree of interaction between student types can explain the mixed (quasi-)experimental
evidence on the effect of de-tracking on student achievement. As changes in peer quality affect good and weak
students’ achievement in very different ways, the term “peer effect” should be used with caution.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents a small theoretical model to investigate the impact of de-tracking on achievement levels of
low-achievers, high-achievers, and the entire student body.1 Proponents of tracking argue that grouping stu-
dents by ability allows teachers to match their instruction more closely to their students’ learning capabilities
which benefits both good and weak students: good students are not slowed down by under-performing class-
mates, and teachers must not worry about losing weaker students. Opponents point out that tracking prevents
weaker students from interacting with their higher-achieving peers, who might provide help and serve as role
models. As a consequence, tracking may preserve economic inequalities.
(Quasi-)experimental empirical evidence on the impact of de-tracking is inconclusive, see Table 1. For ex-
ample, results from a tracking experiment in Kenya ( Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer 2011) suggest that both lower-
and higher-achieving pupils are better off in tracked systems. Somewhat similar to that, Card and Giuliano
(2016) report that ability-tracking is beneficial for students enrolled in the upper track without having negative
consequences for those remaining in the lower-level track. In both studies, therefore, average achievement is
maximized if students are segregated by ability. On the other hand, Pekkarinen, Uusitalo, and Kerr (2013) find
that de-tracking raises average achievement in their sample of Finnish secondary students.2 One may won-
der why some studies find positive while others report negative de-tracking effects. Obviously, de-tracking
increases the within-class heterogeneity in achievement levels. Though it is much less clear how de-tracking
affects the educational progress of various student types. The model presented here assumes that increases
in the share of good students induce teachers to instruct at a more demanding level (pace effect). It is further
assumed that better students create skill-externalities which have a positive effect on weaker students’ learning
(spillover effect).
Table 1: De-tracking effects in empirical and theoretical studies.
Study Country Impact of de-tracking on...
Low-achievers High-achievers Mean achievement
Empirical (tracking experiments)
Lovell (1960) USA − − − *** − **
Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer (2011) Kenya − ** − ** − **
Card and Giuliano (2016) USA none − *** − n.a.
Marascuilo and Maryellen (1972) USA ++ ** − +
DavidKiss is the corresponding author.
© 2017Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston.
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Pekkarinen, Uusitalo, and Kerr
(2013)
Finland ++ ** + + **
Theoretical
Hidalgo-Hidalgo (2011) + − −
Lazear (2001) + − −
Arnott and Rowse (1987) + − ±
This paper ± − ±
Meier (2004) ± ± ±
This table reports signs and significance levels of estimated de-tracking e昀�fects on low-achievers, high-achievers, andmean achievement levels based on
(quasi-)experimental empirical studies. “De-tracking” refers to a scenario where ability-tracked school systems are replaced by comprehensive ones. A + (−)
sign indicates a positive (negative) de-tracking e昀�fect at the ∗10%, ∗∗5%, or ∗∗∗1% significance levels. A doubled sign (e.g., ++) means that the e昀�fect is
strong compared to other outcomes in the same study. Depending on the values of the exogenous parameters, the theoreticalmodels in the bottompanel can
produce a range of de-tracking e昀�fects. ± means that amodel can generate either negative, none, or positive de-tracking e昀�fects.
This paper provides four findings. First, as the current instructional pace is too low (high) for better (weaker)
students, the pace effect turns out to be positive (negative) for better (weaker) students. Weaker students, how-
ever, additionally benefit from spillover effects – the net impact of better classmates therefore depends on
whether the negative pace effect is offset by the positive spillover effect. This result suggests that the term
“peer effect” should be used with caution.
Second, good students are better off in ability-tracked than in comprehensive school systems, which is in
line with most of the empirical evidence. Third, lower-achieving students also prefer tracking if both the share
of better students and the extent of interaction between student types are small. Fourth, mixing can maximize
average achievement if both the share of good students and extent of interaction are high.
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, the results suggest that differences in both the
share of high-achievers and degree of interaction between higher- and lower-achieving students may explain
why some empirical studies in Table 1 find positive de-tracking effects while others report negative ones. Ac-
cording to the model, one should expect negative de-tracking effects if both the share of high-achievers and
the extent of interaction between student types are low. In that case, a weak student’s learning potential is only
marginally enhanced by her better peers.3 At the same time, however, the presence of a few good students
induces teachers to instruct at a more demanding level which results in an instructional pace that is too high
(low) for weak (good) students, therefore making both types worse off in a mixed system. Mixing can maximize
average achievement levels if many well-interacting high-achievers sufficiently increase the learning potential
of their weaker peers.
Second, to the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first that decomposes “peer effects” into a pace and
spillover effect. The few theoretical papers on de-tracking, which are also summarized in Table 1, take peer
effects into account by augmenting a student’s educational production function with the mean achievement
level of her peers – a change in peer achievement levels is then referred to as “the” peer effect without further
distinction. As already mentioned, however, increases in the share of better students may affect higher- and
lower-achieving students in quite different ways.4 The remainder of the paper is as follows. The model is de-
rived in 2. Comparative statics analyzes are presented in 3. 4 contains sensitivity analyzes with regard to the
functional form choices made in 2. 5 concludes.
2 TheModel
2.1 Determinants of Final Achievement
There are two student types
𝜃 ∈ {𝑙, ℎ} = {low, high}
with ℎ > 𝑙 > 0. A student’s learning capability or potential
𝑝u� ≡ 𝜃 + 𝑠u� [1]
is determined by two factors: her type 𝜃 and the extent of spillovers
𝑠u� ≡ 𝑛 𝑖 (ℎ − 𝜃)
which is a function of the exogenous variables 𝑛, 𝑖, ℎ and 𝜃. 𝑛 ∈ [0, 1] is the share of ℎ-types in a class. 𝑖 ∈ [0, 1]
denotes the extent of interaction between ℎ-types and 𝑙-types, and is discussed below in more detail.
2
Bereitgestellt von | Technische Informationsbibliothek Hannover
Angemeldet







































The definition of 𝑠u� comprises two implicit assumptions. First, only 𝑙-types are assumed to benefit from
spillovers because 𝑠ℎ = 0 but 𝑠u� = 𝑛 𝑖 (ℎ − 𝑙) ≥ 0. For example, 𝑙-types may benefit from ℎ-types trough collabo-
rations/study partnerships ( Carrell, Fullerton, and West 2009; Arcidiacono et al. 2012; Jain and Kapoor 2015).
Exposure to ℎ-types may also have a positive effect on 𝑙-types' effort levels ( Eisenkopf 2010, Foster and Frijters
2010, and Bursztyn and Jensen 2015). Generally speaking, ℎ-types may serve as role models.5
Second, 𝑠u� > 0 if (i) the class contains at least one ℎ-type (i.e., 𝑛 > 0) who (ii) is actually willing to interact
with her weaker peers (𝑖 > 0). Depending on how social groups are formed, the extent of interaction 𝑖 may vary
across classes. If, for example, social group formation is mainly determined by gender, then lower-achieving
boys (girls) may easily establish friendships with their higher-achieving male (female) peers, which would be
reflected by a high value of 𝑖 ( Whitmore 2005 and Eisenkopf et al. 2015). In the context of black and white
students, however, one would expect 𝑖 to be small because reference groups are often race-based and black
students tend to have lower achievement levels ( Hoxby 2000 and Fruehwirth 2013).6
Evaluation of eq. (1) for each type yields
𝑝ℎ = ℎ
𝑝u� = 𝑙 + 𝑛 𝑖 (ℎ − 𝑙). [2]
𝑝ℎ ≥ 𝑝u� even though ℎ-types do not receive any spillovers. As long as 𝑛 < 1 or 𝑖 < 1, an ℎ-type's (learning)
potential exceeds the potential of an 𝑙-type. Both u�u�u�u�u� and
u�u�u�
u�u� are positive, i.e., an 𝑙-type's learning potential is
increasing in 𝑛 and 𝑖 as both variables affect 𝑠u� positively.
In this study, the outcome of interest is a student’s (final) achievement
𝑎u�(𝑝) ≡ 𝑝u� − |𝑝 − 𝑝u�| [3]
which is a function of her potential 𝑝u� and the (instructional) pace 𝑝. The pace reflects the amount of material
covered during a school year, and is set by the teacher.7 One can see that
𝑎u�(𝑝 = 𝑝u�) = 𝑝u� > 𝑎u�(𝑝 ≠ 𝑝u�) [4]
that is, the highest achievement level type 𝜃 can reach is her potential 𝑝u� = max{𝑎u�}. However, 𝑎u� is depressed
whenever the teacher’s pace deviates from 𝜃's potential. Intuitively, 𝑝 ≠ 𝑝u� means that the student cannot
develop her full potential because of either being over-challenged (𝑝 > 𝑝u�) or bored (𝑝 < 𝑝u�). The larger the
mismatch |𝑝 − 𝑝u�|, the more 𝑎u�(𝑝) is depressed. As 𝑎u�(𝑝) is maximized at 𝑝 = 𝑝u�, one can interpret 𝑝u� as both 𝜃's
potential and optimal pace.
2.2 Teacher’s Choice of the Instructional Pace 𝑝
Instruction is assumed to be teacher-centered, i.e., teachers never split their time to exclusively instruct sub-
populations of their classes. Therefore 𝑝 is the same for all students. Because (i) ℎ-types' potential exceeds that
of 𝑙-types, see (2), and (ii) each type’s achievement is maximized at 𝑝 = 𝑝u� (see eq. (4)), teachers cannot choose a
pace that maximizes achievement of both types at the same time. It is therefore assumed that teachers are trying
their best to “match” their instructional pace to the skill distribution in their classes. These considerations are
modeled as follows. Let
𝑚u�(𝑝) ∈ [0, 1]
denote the (quality of the) match between 𝜃's optimal pace 𝑝u� and the actual pace 𝑝 chosen by the teacher.
𝑚u�(𝑝) lies in the unit interval with 𝑚u�(𝑝 = 𝑝u�) = 1 denoting a perfect match which is only realized if 𝑝 = 𝑝u�.
Consequently, because teachers value achievement gains of any student type, their pace must be constrained to




1 𝑝 = 𝑝u�
0 𝑝 = 𝑝−u�
.
That is, 𝑚ℎ(𝑝ℎ) = 1 and 𝑚ℎ(𝑝u�) = 0. Thus, as 𝑝 increases, 𝑚ℎ(𝑝) will also increase because 𝑝 is approaching
𝑝ℎ from below. The same logic applies to the quality of the match for 𝑙-types: because 𝑚u�(𝑝ℎ) = 0 and 𝑚u�(𝑝u�) = 1,
the quality of the match for 𝑙-types𝑚u�(𝑝) will improve as 𝑝 decreases.
As already mentioned, teachers cannot maximize both types’ achievement in mixed classes because 𝑝u� ≠ 𝑝ℎ
whenever 0 < 𝑛 < 1. Therefore, when choosing 𝑝, it is assumed that the best teachers can do is to weight each
type’s match by its share. This motivates the following Cobb–Douglas representation of teacher preferences:
𝑢(𝑝) ≡ 𝑚ℎ(𝑝)u� ⋅ 𝑚u�(𝑝)1−u�. [5]
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The teacher’s only choice variable – the instructional pace 𝑝 – maps into both, the quality of the match for
ℎ-types and 𝑙-types. As already shown, increases in 𝑝 benefit ℎ-types but hurt 𝑙-types, and vice versa. Teach-
ers account for this trade-off by weighting each type’s match by its share: 𝑚ℎ(𝑝) is weighted by the share of
high-achievers 𝑛, and 𝑚u�(𝑝) by the share of low-achievers 1 − 𝑛.
To solve eq. (5) for the teacher’s optimal pace 𝑝∗ at which 𝑢(𝑝) is maximized, the functional form of 𝑚u�(𝑝)





which yields 𝑚ℎ(𝑝) =
u�−u�u�
u�ℎ−u�u�
for ℎ-types. This function possesses all required properties: (i) 𝑚ℎ(𝑝) lies in the
unit interval with 𝑚ℎ(𝑝ℎ) = 1 indicating a perfect match. From this it becomes apparent that the sole purpose
of the denominator (𝑝ℎ − 𝑝u�) is to normalize 𝑚ℎ(𝑝). (ii) As long as 𝑝 < 𝑝ℎ, any increase in 𝑝 improves the quality




the smaller 𝑝 becomes, the larger the value of 𝑚u�(𝑝), i.e., the more 𝑝 matches 𝑙's optimal pace 𝑝u�.
Under these functional form choices for 𝑚ℎ(𝑝) and 𝑚u�(𝑝), teacher utility eq. (5) is maximized at
𝑝 = 𝑛 𝑝ℎ + (1 − 𝑛) 𝑝u� =∶ 𝑝∗ [6]
which becomes quickly apparent from deriving the log of eq. (5), and solving the FOC for 𝑝. Eq. (6) states
that the optimal pace 𝑝∗ that maximizes teacher utility is simply a convex combination of each student type’s
optimal pace. If 𝑛 = 0 (𝑛 = 1), teachers will choose 𝑝 = 𝑝u� (𝑝 = 𝑝ℎ). For 0 < 𝑛 < 1, however, teachers weight
each type’s optimal pace by her share.8
2.3 Tracked andMixed School Systems
Once the teacher’s problem is solved, one can proceed with modeling the two school systems (tracked and
mixed). In tracked systems, students are segregated by type, i.e., ℎ-types (𝑙-types) are enrolled in an upper
(lower) level track. Segregation by ability allows teachers to perfectly tailor their instructional pace to each
type’s optimal pace, however, spillovers are absent. In mixed (or comprehensive) school systems, ℎ-types and
𝑙-types are classmates which generates gains from spillovers, but teachers are now forced to set a pace that lies
between each type’s optimal pace. With 𝑎tru� (𝑎
mix
u� ) denoting final achievement of type 𝜃 in a tracked (mixed)
school system, these notions translate into
𝑎trℎ ≡ 𝑎ℎ(𝑝
∗|u�=1) = ℎ 𝑎mixℎ ≡ 𝑎ℎ(𝑝
∗|u�∈(0,1)) = 𝑝∗ [7]
𝑎tru� ≡ 𝑎u�(𝑝
∗|u�=0) = 𝑙 𝑎mixu� ≡ 𝑎u�(𝑝
∗|u�∈(0,1)) = 2𝑝u� − 𝑝∗. [7]
The four functions are plotted in Figure 1. School systems are represented in the model by the values of 𝑛
at which the teacher’s optimal pace 𝑝∗ is evaluated. In tracked systems, there exist only classes with 𝑛 ∈ {0, 1}
which simplifies eq. (3) to 𝑎tru� = 𝜃. Comprehensive (or mixed) systems are characterized by 0 < 𝑛 < 1. Both 𝑎
mix
ℎ
and 𝑎mixu� result from evaluating eq. (3) at 𝑝
∗ while keeping in mind that 𝑝u� < 𝑝∗ < 𝑝ℎ in mixed systems.
Figure 1: Final achievement of ℎ- and u�-types in tracked and mixed school systems. u�mixu� and u�
mix
ℎ are functions of u�, see eq.
(7). In tracked systems, u�tru� = u�. The values of the exogenous parameters u� and ℎ > u� are held fixed in this figure.
3 Comparative Statics
Each of the following three subsections establishes one main finding. I first investigate the marginal impact of
better peers on each type’s final achievement. I then proceed with the effect of “de-tracking”, i.e., the shift from
a tracked school system towards a comprehensive one. The third subsection derives the condition under which
average achievement of all students is maximized under mixing.
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3.1 The E昀�fect of Better Peers on Final Achievement
This subsection investigates how changes in the share of high-achievers 𝑛 affect each type’s final achievement
𝑎u�(𝑝). As this implies 𝑛 ∈ (0, 1) rather than 𝑛 ∈ {0, 1}, the analysis here is entirely based on 𝑎mixℎ = 𝑝
∗ and
𝑎mixu� = 2𝑝u� − 𝑝
∗ from eq. (7).
Let’s first consider the marginal effect of 𝑛 on ℎ-types. Because (i) 𝑝ℎ > 𝑝u� as long as 𝑛 < 1 or 𝑖 < 1, and (ii)








u�u� > 0 means that increases in
𝑛 induce teachers to set a more demanding pace, which raises ℎ-types' final achievement.












The first effect, −u�u�
∗
u�u� < 0, is called (negative) pace effect. Contrary to ℎ-types, the pace effect
u�u�∗
u�u� has a negative
impact on 𝑙-types' achievement. This makes sense because 𝑙-types – who were already struggling with the
current pace (as 𝑝∗ > 𝑝u� whenever 𝑛 > 0) – now face even greater difficulties in keeping up. The second effect,
2u�u�u�u�u� = 2
u�u�u�
u�u� = 2𝑖(ℎ − 𝑙) > 0, called spillover effect, is positive because increases in 𝑛 raise the extent of spillovers
𝑠u� which are beneficial for low-achievers. Taken together, marginal increases in 𝑛 raise 𝑎mixu� only if the negative
pace effect is overcompensated by the positive spillover effect. Therefore,





and detrimental otherwise. ℎ-types always benefit from better peers because the pace effect is positive for them.
This can be shown easily. First note that the partial derivative of 𝑎mixu� from eq. (7) w.r.t. 𝑛, i.e.
u�u�mixu�
u�u� = (ℎ −
𝑙)(−1+𝑖+2𝑖𝑛), is negative for small 𝑛. The explanation for this is captured by (8): u�u�
mix
u�
u�u� < 0 for small values of 𝑛 as
the (positive) spillover effect is dominated by the (negative) pace effect. However, because u�
2u�mixu�
u�u�2 = 2𝑖(ℎ − 𝑙) > 0




u�u� = 0 for 𝑖 yields the combination of 𝑛 and 𝑖 at which the negative pace effect is fully offset by the
positive spillover effect. The positive impact of better peers on ℎ-type's achievement follows from the fact that
𝑎mixℎ = 𝑝
∗ and 𝑝ℎ > 𝑝u� (as long as 𝑛, 𝑖 < 1), which implies that 𝑝∗ = 𝑛 𝑝ℎ + (1 − 𝑛) 𝑝u� must become larger as 𝑛
increases.
Proposition 1 suggests that marginal increases in 𝑛 are beneficial for lower-achieving students only in classes
(𝑛, 𝑖) where 𝑖 > 𝑖∗1 . For ℎ-types, however, the pace effect is positive. Therefore, even though ℎ-types do not benefit
from spillovers, increases in the share of better students always positively affect their achievement.
So far the analysis shows that marginal increases in 𝑛 shape each type’s final achievement in very different
ways. As mentioned in 1, theoretical (empirical) investigations of peer effects usually assume (estimate) models
where own and peer achievement are positively related. The parameter on peer achievement is then interpreted
as “the” peer effect. As shown here, changes in peer achievement levels – or, equivalently, in 𝑛 – affect each type’s
final achievement in different ways, suggesting that the term “peer effect” should be used with caution.
3.2 HowDoesDe-trackingA昀�fect Each Type’s Achievement?
A closer inspection of 𝑎mixu� reveals that (i) the pace is too challenging for 𝑙-types under mixing because – when-
ever 𝑛 < 1 or 𝑖 < 1 – the teacher’s pace must exceed 𝑙's optimal pace, i.e., 𝑝∗ > 𝑝u�. This implies 𝑎mixu� = 2𝑝u�−𝑝
∗ < 𝑝u�:
an 𝑙-type's final achievement therefore lies below her potential under mixing. (ii) However, as stated in the fol-
lowing proposition, this does not necessarily imply that 𝑙-types are hurt from mixing:
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First note that the precondition 𝑛, 𝑖 ∈ (0, 1) implies u�u�
mix
u�
u�u� < 0 for small 𝑛, and
u�2u�mixu�
u�u�2 > 0 (for any 𝑛) for the
same reasons given in Proposition 1. Hence, for 𝑖 = 𝑖∗2 , the positive sign of
u�2u�mixu�
u�u�2 means that spillover effects
might be strong enough to overcompensate both the negative pace effect and the mismatch between current




u� for 𝑖. The statement concerning ℎ-types can be directly
inferred from eq. (7) by comparing 𝑎trℎ with 𝑎
mix
ℎ because 𝑝
∗ < 𝑝ℎ = ℎ for 𝑛, 𝑖 < 1.
Proposition 2 suggests that mixed systems are preferred by 𝑙-types in classes (𝑛, 𝑖) where both the extent of
interaction and the share of ℎ-types are sufficiently high. The required level of interaction at which 𝑙-types are
indifferent between tracking and mixing is decreasing in 𝑛 because u�u�
∗
2
u�u� < 0. ℎ-types are hurt under mixing as
their weaker classmates induce teachers to set a pace that is below their learning potential 𝑝ℎ = ℎ.
3.3 The Impact ofDe-tracking onAverageAchievement
The last policy-relevant variable investigated here is the average achievement level of all students
̄𝑎 ≡ 𝑛 𝑎ℎ(𝑝∗) + (1 − 𝑛) 𝑎u�(𝑝∗),
which is a weighted average of each type’s final achievement under 𝑝∗. In tracked systems, i.e., for 𝑛 ∈ {0, 1}
within each single class, average achievement of all students equals ̄𝑎tr ≡ 𝑛 ℎ + (1− 𝑛)𝑙. To be more elaborate: if
the size of the entire student body is normalized to unity, then the share of classes composed solely of ℎ-types
and 𝑙-types becomes 𝑛 and (𝑛 − 1), respectively. Regarding mixed school systems, one can interpret ̄𝑎mix ≡
𝑛 𝑎mixℎ +(1−𝑛)𝑎
mix
u� as the final achievement level of a single representative class. Comparability between ̄𝑎
tr and
̄𝑎mix is therefore established by normalizing the size of the student body to unity.
Both ̄𝑎tr and ̄𝑎mix are plotted in Figure 2. The graph of ̄𝑎mix turns out to be S-shaped: for 𝑛 smaller than some
threshold 𝑛∗, average achievement in mixed systems is smaller than in tracked ones. However, for 𝑛 ≥ 𝑛∗, mixed
systems yield higher average achievement levels, which is formalized in the following proposition:
Figure 2: Average achievement levels in mixed and tracked school systems. ̄u�mix ( ̄u�tr) is represented by the solid (dashed)
line. One can observe that ̄u�mix ≥ ̄u�tr only for u� greater than u�∗.




As shown in Proposition 1, u�u�
mix
u�
u�u� < 0 for small 𝑛. At the same time,
u� ̄u�tr





u�u� < 0 <
u� ̄u�tr
u�u� ∣u�=0 and limu�→0 ̄𝑎
mix = ̄𝑎tr∣u�=0 imply ̄𝑎
tr > ̄𝑎mix for small values of
𝑛. Consequently, if ̄𝑎mix = ̄𝑎tr can be solved for 𝑖 (which will denote 𝑖∗3 ), there must be a value 𝑛
∗ at which





u�u� ∣u�∗ must hold. Because of that, it must be the case that ̄𝑎
mix∣u� > ̄𝑎
tr∣u� for
𝑛 ∈ (𝑛∗, 1), where 𝑛∗ is obtained from solving 𝑖∗3 for 𝑛 .
Classes (𝑛, 𝑖) with 𝑖 > 𝑖∗3 exhibit higher average achievement levels if students are allowed to learn together
instead of being segregated by ability. As expected, 𝑖∗3 > 𝑖
∗
2 for any 𝑛 because spillovers on 𝑙-types now have to
overcompensate the suboptimal pace for both student types.
The three propositions are summarized in Figure 3. From the model’s perspective, a class (𝑛, 𝑖) can be clas-
sified into one of the following three categories. In category I, de-tracking raises both average achievement
and 𝑙-types' achievement. De-tracking is still beneficial for 𝑙-types in category II, but average achievement is
depressed. Students should be segregated by ability if classes (𝑛, 𝑖) fall into category III.10
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. For classes (u�, u�) that belong to category I, de-tracking raises both final
achievement of low-achievers and average achievement. De-tracking is still beneficial for u�-types in category II, but average
achievement is depressed. Students enrolled in classes (u�, u�) that fall into category III should be segregated by ability.
4 Sensitivity Analyzes
This section investigates whether the main result of this study – Proposition 3 – is sensitive to functional form
changes of key parts of the model: spillovers 𝑠u�, teacher utility 𝑢(𝑝), and final achievement 𝑎u�(𝑝). The findings
presented here are obtained from numerical simulations as the model becomes analytically intractable for alter-
native functional form choices.11 As these analyzes compare average achievement under tracking and mixing,
the domain of 𝑛 is restricted to (0, 1) in the following.
The first set of sensitivity checks considers the generalized spillover function
𝑠u� = (𝑛 𝑖)u�(ℎ − 𝜃)
with 𝛽 ∈ ℝ. The simulations show that Proposition 3 only holds if 𝛽 ≥ 0.6. For smaller 𝛽, it is possible that
̄𝑎mix > ̄𝑎tr for any 𝑛 ∈ (0, 1), i.e., average achievement is maximized under mixing regardless of 𝑛. The reason
why Proposition 3 is violated in this case is simple: (𝑛 𝑖)u� > (𝑛 𝑖) if 𝛽 < 1, i.e, spillovers become more and more
amplified as 𝛽 decreases.
One should therefore be more concerned about the possibility of an upper bound of 𝛽 at which spillovers
become so small that ̄𝑎mix < ̄𝑎tr for all 𝑛. The simulations show that the threshold 𝑛∗ at which ̄𝑎mix > ̄𝑎tr (for any
𝑛 > 𝑛∗) quickly approaches unity as 𝛽 increases. However, 𝑛∗ < 1 even for very large values of 𝛽 (e.g., 𝛽 = 100).
One can therefore conclude that Proposition 3 is valid as long as 𝛽 ≥ 0.6.
Turning to the teacher’s utility function, one may have considered
𝑢(𝑝) = 𝑎ℎ(𝑝)u� 𝑎u�(𝑝)1−u�
as a plausible representation of teacher preferences. This function is maximized at
𝑝∗ = 2𝑛 𝑝u� =
⎧{
⎨{⎩
𝑝u� for 𝑛 ≤ 0.5
min(2𝑛 𝑝u�, ℎ) for 𝑛 > 0.5
.
As discussed in 2.2, 𝑝∗ must lie between 𝑝u� and 𝑝ℎ = ℎ, implying that teachers choose 𝑝∗ = 𝑝u� if 𝑛 ≤ 0.5. Therefore,
as long as 𝑛 ≤ 0.5, 𝑙-types benefit from both the spillovers generated by their abler peers and the optimally
targeted pace 𝑝∗ = 𝑝u�. The good news is that Proposition 3 turns out to hold, even though the teacher’s pacing
now heavily favors 𝑙-types. Therefore the findings of this study are qualitatively the same, regardless whether
𝑢(𝑝) = 𝑚ℎ(𝑝)u�𝑚u�(𝑝)1−u� or 𝑢(𝑝) = 𝑎ℎ(𝑝)u� 𝑎u�(𝑝)1−u� is assumed.
Finally, one may wonder to which extent Proposition 3 is sensitive to alternative specifications of the achieve-
ment function. Its generalized form
𝑎u�(𝑝) = 𝑝u� − (|𝑝 − 𝑝u�|)u�
allows for altering the magnitude of the “penalty” for 𝑝 deviating from 𝑝u�. So far 𝛾 was set to unity. The following
results are based on the restriction |𝑝 − 𝑝u�| < 1, implying that the detrimental impact of (|𝑝 − 𝑝u�|)u� on final
achievement becomes larger as 𝛾 decreases. The simulations show that ̄𝑎mix < ̄𝑎tr for all 𝑛 if 𝛾 ≤ 0.5, therefore
violating Proposition 3. In addition, the graph of ̄𝑎mix looses its S-shape if 𝛾 > 3. Thus Proposition 3 only holds
for 𝛾 ∈ (0.5, 3).
5 Summary andConclusions
This paper investigates the impact of de-tracking on achievement levels of low-achievers, high-achievers, and
the entire student body by means of a small theoretical model. Final achievement is modeled as a function of
a student’s type (low or high), knowledge-spillovers, and the instructional pace, which is tailored to the skill
distribution of a class.
Four findings emerge. First, student types respond in different ways to changes in the skill composition
of a class. Better peers lead to an increase in the instructional pace (pace effect), which is beneficial for good
students. Weak students, however, are struggling with the more demanding pace but are also exposed to ad-
ditional positive knowledge-externalities (spillover effect). Therefore, as the impact of better peers crucially
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depends on a student’s type, the term “peer effect” should be used with caution. Second, good students are
better off in ability-tracked than in mixed school systems, which is in line with most of the empirical evidence.
Third, lower-achieving students learn more under tracking if both the share of good students and the extent
of interaction between student types are small. This may explain why some (quasi-)experimental studies find
negative de-tracking effects for any student type. Fourth, mixing can maximize average achievement if both the
share of good students and extent of interaction are high.
This paper highlights that transmission mechanisms and behavioral adjustments of decision makers should
be taken into account when evaluating the expected impact of changes in the school system. Carrell, Sacerdote,
and West (2013), for example, use reduced form estimates of ability peer effects from a quasi-experimental set-
ting to design student grouping policies that are aimed at helping weaker students. Follow-up assessments,
however, reveal that – compared to non-treated weaker students – targeted students were actually hurt by their
intervention. The authors therefore conclude that “[the use of] reduced-form estimates to make out-of-sample
policy predictions can lead to unanticipated outcomes”.12 The model suggests that comprehensive school sys-
tems become more attractive if both the share of high-achievers and extent of interaction are increased. How-
ever, policymakers who sympathize with mixed systems should be aware that parents of higher-achieving stu-
dents may enroll their children in private schools to prevent them from being exposed to weaker public school
classmates ( Dearden, Ryan, and Sibieta 2011). From the model’s view, this problem could be alleviated to some
extent by the provision of norms and learning environments that motivate student types interact more.13 To
make school system choices more informed, further research could additionally investigate whether a coun-
try’s economic prosperity is primarily determined by the average achievement level of its population, or the
abilities of (a small number of) exceptionally talented individuals.14
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Notes
1In tracked school systems, students are segregated by academic achievement into different school types or separate classrooms within
schools. By contrast, de-tracked/mixed/comprehensive systems are characterized by greater within-class-heterogeneity in skills. Through-
out, the terms ability, achievement and skills are used interchangeably.
2There are also numerous non-experimental studies on this topic. Based on DiD-estimates, Hanushek and Wößmann (2006) find that
early tracking increases educational inequality and may reduce average achievement. Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2007) arrive at similar
results. Additional studies are summarized and discussed in the comprehensive surveys conducted by Meier and Gabriela (2008) and Betts
(2011) .
3Throughout this paper, students are female and teachers are male. The gender of students and teachers was decided by coin toss.
4Such “monotonous” or “one-dimensional” peer effects are employed in both empirical investigations of ability peer effects (see Ding
and Lehrer 2007; Carrell, Fullerton, and West 2009, or Imberman, Kugler, and Sacerdote 2012) as well as theoretical papers on, for example,
effort formation ( Foster and Frijters 2009), school competition ( Fraja and Landeras 2006) or residential segregation ( Epple and Romano
1998). The only exception is Lazear (2001). His model differentiates students by their likelihood of exerting disruptive behavior rather than
scholastic achievement. However, Lazear (2001) further notes that a student’s achievement and disruptive behavior are often negatively
correlated which has been shown empirically by Lavy, Paserman, and Schlosser (2011) .
5As will be shown later, better peers also have an indirect positive effect on ℎ-types' achievement.
6Weinberg (2007) shows empirically that students have stronger social ties with peers who are “similar” to them (known as “homophily”
in the sociological literature). Halliday and Kwak (2012) further suggest that mean achievement levels of a student’s reference group matter
most for her own achievement.
7Alternatively, one might hold the curriculum fixed and think of u� as the “depth” of coverage in the sense of Carrell and West (2010) .
8Alternatively, one could have based teacher utility directly on student achievement u�u�(u�) and suggested u�(u�) = u�ℎ(u�)u� ⋅ u�u�(u�)1−u�
to represent teacher preferences. As will be shown in 4, however, the results turn out to be qualitatively the same, regardless whether
u�(u�) = u�ℎ(u�)u�u�u�(u�)1−u� or u�(u�) = u�ℎ(u�)u� u�u�(u�)1−u� is employed.
9For illustrative purposes, one can further compare the graphs of u�tru� and u�
mix
u� in Figure 1.
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10One may wonder to which extent these findings carried over to settings with, say, three student types u� (low), u� (middle), and ℎ (high)
where ℎ-types' spillovers only increase the potential of u�-types, and u�-types only affect u�-types' learning potential. The effect of an increase
in u�, the share of ℎ-types, would still be similar to the two-student-type case: an increase in u� would indirectly increase an u�-type's potential
through its direct impact on the potential of u�-types. However, as u�-types are fully affected by the pace-effect but only receive (potentially
weak) indirect spillovers, one should expect that the conditions under which Propositions 1 through 3 hold become more restrictive.
11Simulation results are based on the following domains in the exogenous variables: ℎ ∈ (0, 2], u� ∈ [0, ℎ), and u� ∈ [0, 1]. A summary of
the sensitivity analyzes is available on request.
12This quote is taken from the abstract of the working-paper version Carrell, Sacerdote, and West (2011). In the context of educational
production, careful empirical investigations of transmission channels are becoming more common. See, for example, Fraja, Oliveira, and
Zanchi (2010) and Lavy and Schlosser (2011), or Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013). To empirically test the model, one could operationalize u�
by grouping students by proficiency levels (see OECD 2011 : 453 as an example) into better and weaker ones. The role of u� could be assessed
by assuming that within a class, interaction levels among students of the same gender are higher than cross-gender interaction levels (see
Crosnoe et al. 2008 and Hill 2015).
13Estevan (2016), for instance, finds that higher public school expenditures are associated with reductions in private school enrollment,
partly because public schools attract better teachers ( Behrman et al. 2016).
14The importance of top-achievers for a country’s technological and scientific progress is investigated by, among others, Squicciarini and
Nico (2015) and Ellison and Swanson (2016). On the other hand, cross-country comparisons conducted by Hanushek and Kimko (2000)
and Jamison, Jamison, and Hanushek (2007) show that a one standard deviation increase in average math test scores can boost annual GDP
growth by up to 1.0pp.
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